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Economic Perspective 2 
GUINNESS AND DISTILLERS: SOC CURRENT ISSUES IN HEHGERS POLICY 
by J H Love 
Fraser of Allander Inst i tute, University of Strathclyde 
In early June the Government announced i t s 
intention to hold a review of competition 
policy la ter this year. The announcement 
was par t icular ly timely with regard to 
policy on mergers and takeovers, which has 
been subject to considerable criticism in 
the light of several recent very large and 
fiercely contested takeover bids. One of 
t h e s e b i d s , t h a t by Guinness fo r 
D i s t i l l e r s , has a very strong Scottish 
dimension, and t h i s i s t he re fo re an 
appropriate time to consider some of the 
policy issues raised as a resu l t of t h i s 
particular takeover. 
The present framework 
( i i ) to advise the Secretary of State on 
whether a qualifying merger should be 
subject to investigation by the MMC. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, companies 
involved in qualifying mergers may spend a 
g rea t deal of time and e f f o r t in 
attempting to persuade the OFT that a 
par t icular bid should or should not be 
referred. A referred bid automatically 
lapses while the MMC's investigation takes 
place, causing a delay of up to nine 
months in exceptional circumstances, with 
the poss ib i l i ty of the proposed merger 
being blocked. 
The present framework of mergers policy in 
the UK involves three main pa r t i e s . As 
the Office of Fair Trading describes i t , 
the Secre tary of S ta t e for Industry 
decides, the Director General of Fair 
Trading advises, and the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (MMC) investigates. 
Despite the publicity frequently given to 
invest igat ions by the MMC, the crucial 
role i s really that played by the Director 
General through the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT). The OFT has two main functions to 
perform with regard to mergers: 
Much of the controversy raised by the 
Guinness merger with D i s t i l l e r s has a 
direct bearing on this key role played by 
the OFT. During the contested bid some 
fair ly wide-ranging promises were made 
both by the Argyll Group and by Guinness 
about the l o c a t i o n of head of f ice 
functions and decision-making in Scotland 
following the merger. The precise nature 
of the commitments made by Guinness were 
spelled out in publicity material during 
the course of the bid as follows: 
( i ) to keep a check on proposed mergers 
in order to d iscover which are 
"qualifying" mergers (ie where the 
gross assets to be taken over exceed 
£30m, or where the merged companies 
would control 25% or more of the UK 
market for some good or service); 
"The corporate 
new Scottish-r 
company, with 
established in 
wi l l be the 
company of the 
pic, Guinness 
o p e r a t i n g 
worldwide. 
headquarters of a 
egistered holding 
i t s board, will be 
Edinburgh. This 
ult imate holding 
Distillers Company 
pic and a l l the i r 
s u b s i d i a r i e s , 
62 
The Chief Execut ive , and key 
d i rec tors and senior executives 
of the expanded group wi l l be 
based in Edinburgh along with a 
corporate support team which will 
i n c l u d e l e g a l , p e r s o n n e l , 
financial, accounting, marketing, 
administrat ion, production and 
r e s e a r c h and d e v e l o p m e n t 
functions." 
Already plans for the two-t ier board 
system envisaged above have been scrapped 
leading to serious doubts about Guinness's 
other assurances. The relevant question 
here i s whether the law and policy on 
mergers should be of a type which allows a 
bidding company to make commitments, 
p re sumab ly d e s i g n e d t o i n f l u e n c e 
shareholders of the merger partner and 
other concerned p a r t i e s , then appear to 
renege on these commitments a t the 
e a r l i e s t poss ib le oppor tun i ty . The 
Guinness argument in favour of the changed 
plans i s simple. Ultimately, the board 
must act in the best i n t e r e s t s of the 
shareholders on the basis of as much 
information as i s avai lable . With due 
consideration a f t e r t akeover , i t now 
becomes apparent that the or iginal two-
t i e r board and independent chairman (Sir 
Thomas Risk) would not work. What i s 
needed, runs the argument, i s for Mr 
Ernest Saunders to have a strong Chief 
Executive's role unencumbered by too much 
bureaucracy. Unfortunately, this requires 
t h a t c e r t a i n assurances cannot be 
fulfilled; but this i s ultimately done for 
the benefit of the shareholders who wil l , 
after a l l , be able to vote on the issue at 
an EGM. 
The Secretary of State for Scotland may 
frown on t h i s sor t of argument and the 
Bank of England may wag an admonishing 
finger but the fact remains that the 
argument of "shareholders' interest" i s a 
very powerful one. Under i t s present 
guise mergers policy can do nothing, 
especial ly where the promises made were 
not themselves instrumental in having the 
bid cleared by the OFT. However, given 
the current upsurge in the number and size 
of contested bids i t seems l ike ly that 
this will be an issue under consideration 
in the forthcoming policy review. 
Emerging policy 
By coincidence, in the very same week as 
the Guinness/Distillers boardroom changes 
were being made an important paper on 
merger policy was given by Sir Gordon 
Borrie, Director General of Fair Trading, 
at a conference organised by the Insti tute 
of Fiscal Studies. In h i s paper Sir 
Gordon touched on the new phenomenon of 
"plea ba rga in ing" during major b i d s . 
This i s the process by which bidding firms 
wi l l negotiate with the OFT to moderate 
potentially anti-competitive aspects of a 
bid and thus avoid re fe r ra l to the MMC. 
In the case of Guinness and Dist i l lers the 
process went a stage further; the bid was 
effectively "de-referred" when Guinness 
agreed to s e l l off the UK r igh t s to some 
of i t s brands to Whyte and Mackay, thus 
reducing (for the time being) Guinness's 
share of the UK market below the 25J level 
which constitutes a statutory monopoly. 
Sir Gordon admits in his paper tha t , 
" divestment schemes cobbled together 
in haste might not in fact be conducive to 
t h e e f f i c i e n c y of t h e u n d e r l y i n g 
business". But he argues tha t since 
" th i s i s not necessarily the case", 
he i s very much in favour of the plea 
bargaining process. 
To the outside observer such an attempt at justification seems appallingly weak, and 
sheds no l i g h t a t a l l on why the OFT 
allowed Guinness to proceed uninhibited 
with a "new" bid based on the flimsiest of 
a l t e r a t ions to the "old" bid. I t i s not 
clear whether Sir Gordon sought assurances 
from Guinness about the permanence of the 
arrangements with Whyte and Mackay, nor 
whether i t was assured (or assumed) that 
Guinness would be unable to ra ise i t s 
market share above 25$ with i t s remaining 
brands in the near future. 
The whole process of plea bargaining, 
especially where a bid has already been 
r e f e r r e d t o t h e MMC, s e r v e s t o 
fundamentally a l t e r the nature of the 
relationship between the OFT and the MMC. 
The whole tone of Sir Gordon Borrie's 
paper appears to suggest that the role of 
' the OFT in mergers policy ought to be 
strengthened, with increased discret ion 
being allowed for plea bargaining and 
other discussions. In fact , as was 
argued earlier, the OFT already has a very 
c o n s i d e r a b l e deg ree of power in 
recommending (and so virtually deciding) 
which bids shal l be investigated, power 
which i t has used to the ful l in the case 
of Guinness and D i s t i l l e r s . 
The review of competition policy wi l l 
almost cer ta inly seek to consider the 
division of tasks between OFT and MMC, but 
i t should be regarded as imperative that 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, and 
not the Office of Fair Trading, remains 
the primary plank of mergers policy. 
Only the MMC has the statutory obligation 
to consider "the public in te res t" and to 
make public i t s decisions and the reasons 
for them; t h i s i s a duty which should be jealously protected, not removed to the 
shadowy world of plea bargaining and 
private discussions behind closed doors. 
If th i s means more referred bids and 
delayed mergers, then so be i t . The 
weight of academic evidence suggests that 
the gains from merger are, in the main, 
disappointing in the final analysis. 
Finally, i t i s worthwhile ref lect ing on 
another part of Sir Gordon Borrie's paper, 
in which he deals with whether a n t i -
competitive mergers ought to be allowed to 
proceed on the grounds that merger might 
improve the competitiveness of the firms 
concerned in overseas markets. This 
issue i s , of course, of direct relevance 
in the Guinness/Distillers merger. Here, 
the Director General says: 
"Under the Fair Trading Act the 
proper agency for advis ing 
Government on [this issue] i s the 
Commission and I am not entitled 
to usurp their function." 
This i s indeed the case, and should remain 
so. Yet in the D i s t i l l e r s merger the 
claims made by Guinness in this direction 
were not allowed to be aired by an MMC 
investigation because of the actions of 
the OFT in fa i l ing to refer the "new" bid 
following plea bargaining. Once again 
Sir Gordon appears to take the view that 
this i s a case for making his office more 
powerful, allowing the OFT to consider 
i s s u e s s u c h as i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
competitiveness. 
However, a more considered view might be 
that since the MMC i s the body charged 
with advising the Government on th i s 
issue, then the Commission should have 
been given the opportunity to consider 
Guinness's claims. Given the importance 
of the whisky industry to the Scottish 
economy, these claims could reasonably 
have been regarded as being within the 
remit of "the public interest". 
Regardless of the outcome of the merger 
between Guinness and D i s t i l l e r s , the 
handling of the bid reflects l i t t l e credit 
either on the OFT or on UK mergers policy. 
Any attempt in the forthcoming policy 
review to strengthen the hand of the OFT 
a t the expense of the MMC should be 
resisted; the OFT serves a useful function 
as a "first sift" for qualifying mergers, 
but i t should not be allowed to develop 
into an a l te rna t ive and more secret ive, 
Mergers Commission. 
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